George Eastman built a technology moat that was ultimately vulnerable to disruption; Kodak owned photography but couldn't own the digital revolution that killed film. His $1.45B fortune was anchored to a consumable product (film rolls) with built-in obsolescence risk, whereas Wilson's $1.8B came from a defensive, recurring-revenue model. Hotels don't get disrupted by better hotels—they get disrupted by regulation changes and labor costs, which move slowly. Eastman's wealth peaked when film was king; Wilson's kept compounding because franchise fees and real estate appreciation worked in his favor for decades.

The franchise model Wilson deployed was a wealth multiplication machine that Eastman never accessed. Holiday Inn didn't need to own every property—franchisees bore capital risk while Wilson collected royalties and brand premiums, a cash-on-cash return structure that generated passive wealth at scale. Eastman, by contrast, had to manufacture, distribute, and defend Kodak's market share through direct operations. Wilson's $1.8B reflects 40+ years of franchise expansion where each new location was someone else's investment; Eastman's $1.45B had a ceiling because manufacturing capacity and market saturation were real constraints.

The final gap widens because of *when* they built wealth. Eastman's fortune was largely accumulated and then froze in value (adjusted to today's dollars); Wilson's $1.8B was built during post-war American expansion when suburban travel, franchise law, and real estate appreciation aligned perfectly. Wilson also had the advantage of timing: he entered hospitality when it was fragmented and ripe for consolidation, whereas Eastman entered photography when he had to invent the entire category. First-mover advantage is overrated; being first into a *scalable franchise model* during the right era beats being a visionary inventor every time.